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Abstract 
Although the phenomenon of international migration has been around for a while, in the 
last decades there has been a world-wide resurgence of it, which is larger in scale, wider is 
scope and is frequently accompanied by large flows of monetary remittances. These 
tendencies have revived the debate in the academic and policy spheres over their potential 
social and economic consequences. In this paper we develop a ‘Primer’ that presents the 
‘state of the art’ in the study of international migration and make special emphasis on how 
Latin American countries fits in it. We first present an overview of migration patterns in the 
region and highlight the importance of the United States as the prime destination for Latin 
American migrants. We then develop the core of the paper which reviews the different 
theories that have been proposed in the academic literature for explaining both the 
determinants of migration and its potential impacts, particularly from the perspective of the 
source country. In the process, we accentuate the central role played by international 
remittances. Finally, based on the current knowledge frontier in the subject, we propose a 
research agenda in order to fill some of the current shortages in the analysis of migration in 
the region.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Migration has recently taken an important place in the agenda of many governments 
around the world. But the phenomenon of international mobility of individuals is not 
new. Following Massey [2003], the modern history of international migration can be 
divided into four periods. During the mercantile period, from about 1500 to 1800, world 
immigration was dominated by flows out of Europe and stemmed from processes of 
colonization and economic growth under mercantile capitalism. Over the course of 300 
years, Europeans came to inhabit large portions of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and 
Oceania. The second was the industrial period which began early in the 19th Century and 
stemmed from industrial development in Europe and the spread of capitalism to former 
colonies in the New World. The period from 1800 to 1929 represents the first period of 
economic globalization, characterized by massive flows of capital, raw materials, and 
goods back and forth between Europe, the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific. Associated 
with this expanding global economy was the large-scale movement of people, itself 
rooted in structural transformations that overtook successive European nations as they 
industrialized and were incorporated into the global trading regime. The United States 
by itself absorbed around 60% of Europe’s total outflow, and another 25% of the 
emigrants were scattered among Argentina, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
Large-scale emigration from Europe faltered with the outbreak of World War I, which 
brought European emigration to an abrupt halt and ushered in a four-decade period of 
limited migration. Migration flows were also affected by the Great Depression, the Second 
World War, and the rise of autarkic economic nationalism in both Europe and the 
Americas. It is in the middle 1960s that there was a resurgence of large-scale international 
migration. As a result of a high international mobility without precedents throughout 
much of the world, the migrant population worldwide started increasing rapidly as 
percentage of the total world population (see Figure 1). This new era of post-industrial 
migration also constituted a sharp break with the past; rather than being dominated by 
outflows from Europe to a handful of settler societies, immigration became truly global 
in scope as the number and variety of both sending and receiving countries increased. 
The global supply of immigrants shifted from Europe to developing countries. The 
variety of destination countries has also grown. In addition to traditional immigrant-
receiving nations in Oceania and the Americas, countries throughout Western Europe 
now attract significant numbers of immigrants—notably Germany, France, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands.  
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 Figure 1. Immigrant Population Worldwide, Absolute numbers and as % of total 
population  
 
``Source: United Nations, Population Division, World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population 
Database 
 
According to the United Nations’ Population Division, the number of international 
migrants has more than doubled since 1975 reaching 190 million people (2.9 % of the 
world population). Most of the world’s migrants live in Europe (64 million), Asia (53 
million) and North America (44 million). But if one takes the stock of migrants as a 
percentage of total population, then migration plays a more important role in North 
America, where foreigners represent 13.5% of total population, against 8.8% in Europe 
and only 1.4% in Asia. Although since the early 1990s family-linked immigration (family 
reunification) has proportionally increased in some countries, including the United 
States, the rise in employment-related migration has been the most salient feature in most of 
the receiving countries (OECD [2006]). These new tendencies in population flows have 
revived the debate over the social and economic consequences of international migration, 
and have thus motivated many academic researchers and policy makers to develop and 
estimate models designed to determine the causes of migration and to measure their 
impact.  
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Figure 2. Foreign Population in Selected Countries, 2005 (Millions) 
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In this paper we develop a ‘Primer’ that presents the ‘state of the art’ in the study of 
international migration and make special emphasis on how the Latin American 
experience fits in it. All of the theoretical developments are therefore complemented with 
a discussion relevant for the region. Given the magnitude of the migration numbers, 
Mexico, which according to Holzmann et al [2005] is the largest source of migrants in the 
world, has received more attention in the academic literature and policy publications. In 
fact, there is actually a shortage of studies and data on migration occurring in other Latin 
American countries. The Mexican case, therefore, frequently appears as an example 
throughout the document and some of the lessons from Mexico are surely relevant for 
other countries. Nevertheless, in Central America, where emigration represent a higher 
fraction of their labor force and the remittances they send back home account for a 
striking percentage of national income, the phenomenon is alarmingly understudied and 
given their differences with Mexico, especially in terms of size, the conclusions of current 
research cannot be always generalized. A more systemic exploration of the phenomenon 
in the whole region is, therefore, needed. 
Section II presents an overview of migration patterns in the region. It highlights the 
importance of the United States as the prime destination of Latin American migrants. 
Section III is the core of the paper and reviews the different theories that have been 
proposed in the academic literature for explaining the occurrence of migration flows and 
their possible effects. We explore, in particular, the contributions offered by economic 
theory, where individuals’ decision-making plays a central role. Since migration is very 
unlikely to be a ‘one-off’ decision, we address the three main subjects in the study of 
migration behavior that emerge in a dynamic context: (i) the decision to migrate, (ii) the 
saving/consumption patterns of migrants, including the sending of remittances and (iii) 
the decision to return home and the optimal length of stay abroad. But the economic 
premise of individual self-interest, even in a full dynamic framework, is not capable on 
its own to explain some observed phenomena. This section is complemented by a 
discussion of the importance of institutions, networks and extended families in the 
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process of migration. On the side of effects, we emphasize the importance of 
international remittances both as a direct consequence of international migration and as a 
vehicle causing itself further effects on home countries. The motives behind the process 
of remittances are closely related to the migration decision, the existence of extended 
families and, possibly more important, the decision to return home. These phenomena 
must, therefore, be studied together, and not as separate topics as frequently found in the 
literature. Finally, based on the current knowledge frontier in the subject, and taking 
account of the characteristics of migration patterns in the region, in Section IV we 
propose a research agenda in order to fill some of the current shortages in the analysis of 
migration in Latin America. Our proposal place a special stress on Central America, 
where economies rely significantly on those flows and, given the current global economic 
trends, with the economic activity in the United States in recession, are more likely to be 
hit in terms of welfare.    
2. Migration Trends in Latin America 
The phenomenon of migration in Latin America had been in the past essentially one of 
net immigration, especially from individuals flowing in mass waves from Europe. The 
first wave occurred with European colonization which started in the 16th century. The 
second important wave took place between 1870 and 1940 involving mass movements of 
European labor, especially to Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela (Clark et al [2003]).  After 
the 1960s, however, a very different history has taken place and Latin American countries 
have turned from net importers of migrants into net exporters. Although, they have 
started to explore new options, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and some European 
countries (Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom), the United States has never lost its 
importance as the principal destination for Latin American emigrants (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Stock of Latin American Emigrants outside LA, 2000 
 
Source: ECLAC, Globalización y Desarrollo and Clark et al [2003]. 
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Migrants also move, although in a lower extent, to other countries within the region (see 
Martinez-Pizarro and Villa [2005]). Argentina has been the traditional host country of 
large contingents of Bolivians, Chileans, Paraguayans, and Uruguayans, as well as a 
significant number of Peruvians since the 1990s. Venezuela has received large flows of 
Colombians following the economic upturn triggered by the oil boom in the 1970s. In the 
1990s Chile also registered an important immigration from other South American 
countries, especially from Peru. In Central America, Costa Rica is the host country of 
large contingents of Nicaraguans (who accounted for 83% of regional immigrants to this 
country in 2000), attracted by the demand of labor in the agricultural and service sectors. 
Mexico also became an important recipient of flows originating in Central America, 
especially in Guatemala and El Salvador. 
 
Figure 4. Origin of Hispanic People Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status in 
the U.S., period 1998-2007 
 
1) Each country share:  
 
2) Absolute number by country and as % of each nation’s population, 2007: 
 
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
2007 and US Census Bureau International database. 
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 Although the flow of Latin American workers abroad has then been around for some 
decades, it had never been as significant as in the last two. In a new wave of migration 
flows, which started in the 1990s and are present up to date, Latin American workers 
have started flowing in unprecedented numbers and have increasingly favored the 
United States as their prime destination. Therefore, despite the existence of other inter-
regional and intra-regional movements, explaining emigration from Latin America is 
largely a matter of explaining emigration into the United States. By contrast, by 2000 
more than 55 % of all immigrants in the US were Latin Americans. The number of 
migrant workers leaving some countries, particularly in Central America and the 
Caribbean, is so high that this sole event, together with the consequent phenomenon of 
remittances, is capable of dictating the functioning of their whole economies.   
If one look at the trends of people acquiring permanent residence in the United States, 
depicted in Figure 5, it would seem that migration annual flows have been relatively 
constant since the 1990’s. However, following numbers extracted by Martinez-Pizarro 
and Villa [2005] from the Current Population Survey, the stock of Latin American and 
Caribbean immigrants in the United States doubled between 1980 and 1990 and 
represented 43% of the total foreign population registered in the country in 1990. The 
Hispanic and Caribbean population reached an estimated 18 million people in 2004, 
which represents roughly a 100 % increase with respect to 1990. Much of the recent 
increase in migration flows is, therefore, estimated to come from a higher movement of 
undocumented migrants.      
 
Figure 5. Trends of people acquiring legal permanent residence in the Unites States 
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Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2007. 
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Mexico accounts for more that 50% of the Latin American and Caribbean population in 
the United States. Caribbeans and Central Americans accounted for roughly 19% and 
17%, respectively, in 2004. The accumulated population of Mexican immigrants in the 
U.S. constitutes about 10% of Mexico’s total population and more than 15 % of its labor 
force (Mishra [2007]) and the number of migrants departing annually is estimated to be 
almost equivalent to the annual increase of the labor force. According to the estimates of 
the US Department of Homeland Security, almost 7 million illegal Mexican workers 
resided in the United States in 2007. Migrants from Central America are also frequently 
illegal. Combining the estimation of the stock of undocumented immigrants, done by the 
US Department of Homeland Security, and the total number of foreign-born population 
from Central America in the United States, which is obtained from the US Census 
Bureau, the result is that for countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras the 
number of their people residing illegally in the United States in 2000 represented 52.6%, 
60.3% and 56.6%, respectively, of the total immigrant population.   
 
Figure 6. Estimations of the stock of undocumented immigrants in the Unites States 
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Source: US Department of Homeland Security, Population Estimates September 2008. Data for 
2000 is Censual data from the 2000 Census. Data for 2007 comes from the 2007 American 
Community Survey. Both stocks of population include both legal and unauthorized population 
 
The increase of the migrant population has been accompanied by a spectacular increase 
in international remittances. According to the World Bank [2005], migrant remittances to 
developing countries have grown rapidly reaching $127 billion in 2004 and surpassing 
official development assistance. Following Acosta et al [2006], Latin America is the region 
that receives the largest amount (US$45 billion in 2004, which represents 27% of all 
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remittances to developing countries). Mexico, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador are among the top-20 country recipients of remittances 
globally. But seen as fraction of national income, it is for countries of Central America 
that remittances have doubtless had a vital influence on their economies. In Honduras, 
for instance, individuals living overseas represent around 3.7% of the total population. 
But regarding remittances, the tendency has been an increase from less than 2% of GDP 
in 1990 to 21% in 2007.. In another example, in Nicaragua remittances also started 
increasing since the mid-1990s reaching annual flows over 10% of GDP (sources like the 
Central Bank of Nicaragua estimated a figure of 13% of GDP in 2005). These figures are 
extremely high when compared against the fraction of remittances to GDP of 2.5% in the 
entire developing world.  
 
Figure 7. Remittances flowing to Central America, Million US$ 
 
Source: World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank 
 
The total amount of remittances in Central America grew 450% from 1996 to 2006 (see 
Figure 7) and these tendencies have important economic implications both at the macro 
and the micro level. The most important question is whether those flows of resources 
generate any benefit on the receiving country. One might expect a positive relationship 
between remittances and growth for countries with the complementary assets to take 
advantage of the infusion of capital. This would be the case when remittances are 
invested in new business back in the home country.1 But even in the case that remittances 
do not provide macroeconomic stimulus, at the microeconomic level of individuals they 
                                                            
1 See Fajnzylber and Lopez (2008), who point out that remittances have a positive impact on 
growth, half of which is explained by raising investment. 
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may alleviate poverty and insure households against economic downturns, taking a 
burden off fragile government institutions.  
 
Figure 8. Remittances in 2007, absolute numbers and as % of national GDP  
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Source: World Bank estimates based on the International Monetary Fund's Balance of 
Payments Statistics Yearbook 2008. 
3. Theories of Migration 
 
The economics of migration covers a broad variety of themes dealing with the 
determinants and effects of migration movements. Regarding the migration decision, 
there are different bodies of theory that address the determinants. The two more cited in 
economics are the neoclassical approach (influence mainly by the seminal work by Harris 
and Todaro [1970]) and the New Economics of Labor Migration (triggered by Stark 
[1978]). The key premise of the neoclassical perspective is the supremacy of rational 
individuals’ self-interests and their reaction to differences in income levels between the 
origin and the destination countries. This theory can be approached in a Macro 
perspective, determining migration flows by changes in aggregate variables, or putting 
more emphasis in particular individual characteristics in order to understand the 
incentives of different types of people to move abroad. The NELM moves the unit of 
analysis from individuals to families, putting special emphasis on informal arrangements 
as the determinants of migration flows.   
On the side of effects, there is a vast literature on the impact of these flows of migrant 
workers on the receiving country, which includes consequences on wages and the labor 
markets, public finances, and many other economic and social variables (Borjas [1994]). 
Although there have been recent attempts to study the migration/remittance phenomena 
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from the viewpoint of the source country, a significant part of which has been published 
by the Journal of Economic Development, significantly fewer studies have been devoted 
to investigate what happens to economic opportunities in source countries when a 
selected subsample of their population moves elsewhere. Economic outcomes in source 
countries are shaped by three forces: (i) the migration flow itself that creates changes in 
labor markets and the population structure; (ii) the possibility of return migration, whose 
feedback effect makes the composition of population and labor more complex; and (iii) 
the existence of international remittances that affect, among other things, consumption 
possibilities of the receptor households as well as potential investments. One should also 
consider multiplier effects of remittances through their spending on products and 
services produced by other community members, and other potential spillover and 
general equilibrium effects; this also includes the network effects of migration on the 
costs and benefits of migration for other community members (Mckenzie and Rapoport 
[2007]). 
 
3.1 Determinants of Migration 
3.1.1 Wages and Push-Pull Factors.  
Recent studies on migration have framed the problem under a labor economics 
perspective. The question of labor factor mobility had created, however, a long tradition 
on the international theory of trade. As pointed by Glover et al. [2001] “the migration of 
people is a factor being traded between countries: economic migration is normally a 
voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer (whoever is willing to employ the 
migrant) and a willing seller (the migrant), and is hence likely to be both economically 
efficient and beneficial to both parties. Like in trade of goods, migration generally is 
expected to yield welfare gains. “As long as the marginal productivity of labor differs in 
various countries, the migration of labor is welfare improving”, say the authors.  
That said, the basic premise underlying both approaches is the idea of individual 
optimizing behavior. One key difference between migration and trade is that – unlike 
goods or capital – migrants are economic and social agents themselves, with a degree of 
control over the migration decision. So unlike goods or capital, migrants are self-selected. 
Partly as a result, migration is most likely to occur precisely when it is most likely to be 
welfare-enhancing. Economic theory suggests that individuals behave in ways that 
maximize their well-being. Under this premise, potential migrants compare all feasible 
alternatives and choose a country which provides the best opportunities. If countries 
which are abundant in labor have lower wages than countries which are abundant in 
capital, then workers will, if labor is mobile, have an incentive to migrate from the poorer 
to the richer country.  
Migrant flows to a chosen country depend, therefore, on a set of factors relevant to the 
source country (‘Push’ factors), host country (‘Pull’ factors) and the characteristics of the 
migrants themselves. Since the seminal work by Harris and Todaro [1970] it is common 
to hypothesize that the migration decision of an individual is determined by the 
economic differences between the source and the receiving region (country) in variables 
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such as levels of income (or wages) and the expected unemployment rate. The theory of 
income differentials constitutes the base of the mainstream approach to migration. 
Additional variables that may influence the decision include the direct financial cost of 
migration, non-wage job characteristics workers may value such as access to social 
security and protection systems, safety, lack of stress, opportunities for advancement, 
prestige, housing or transportation. Factors related to ‘living conditions’ include crime 
rates, availability of schools for children, language spoken, and etcetera.  
One general conclusion of the estimation of gravity equations in different studies, where 
aggregate flows of migration are determined by variables such as the size of population 
both in the source and the receiving countries, the size of national incomes or per capita 
incomes and unemployment rates, is that migration seems more responsive to 
movements of the relevant variables in the receiving country (the US in the case of great 
part of the Latin American experience) than  to movements in the source country. The 
greater importance of ‘pull’ factors has also been found in the study of migration for 
other regions (e.g. Mayda [2007]).  
The own Mayda [2007] proposes that the asymmetric effect between the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ 
factors may be explained by the demand side of international migration - namely, 
migration policies - and not by the supply side as is often assumed in the previous 
literature. Changes in mean income opportunities in the destination country not only 
affect migrants’ incentive to move there but also impact the political process behind the 
formation of migration policies. In periods of economic booms, policymakers are better 
able to overcome political opposition to increasing migration inflows. Institutions and 
policy may, therefore, be relevant players in the migration process. 
 
3.1.2 Distribution of skills, Inequality and Selection of Migrants 
Note that the push-pull approach à la Harris-Todaro says nothing about the 
heterogeneity of individuals. In addition to the size and direction of migration flows, 
there are other equally important questions which can be analyzed in the context of the 
income maximization model. Which persons, for instance, find it worthwhile to migrate 
to the host country? Borjas [1987], followed by an important body of work, proposes that 
the magnitude and type of migration flows are also determined, besides the variables we 
have considered above, by the heterogeneity of migrants and the distribution of skills 
and income in both the source and the receiving countries. He theoretically predicts that 
in countries with high returns to skills and high wage dispersion, as in much of Latin 
America, there will be negative selection of immigrants: those with the greatest incentive to 
migrate will be individuals with below-average skill levels in their home countries. In 
countries with low returns to skill and lower wage dispersion, there will be positive 
selection of immigrants: those with above-average skill levels will have the greatest 
incentive to migrate.2 
                                                            
2 The self-selection model has the limitation that it is only supply-sided. It does not explain the 
demand for immigrants of the host country.  
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Stark [2005] further claims that, in the prevalence of relative deprivation at the source 
country, migration will be negatively selected, independently of the comparison of the 
degree of income inequality between the origin and destination countries. In other 
words, negative selectivity arises from the inequality of the income distribution at the 
origin country per se. The argument is that individuals care about their relative position, 
and household members undertake migration not necessarily to increase the household's 
absolute income but rather to improve the household's position (in terms of relative 
deprivation) with respect to a specific reference group. In this context, higher positioned 
individuals would be less willing to change to another relative income group than 
individuals at the bottom of the distribution. For the case of Mexico, Stark and Taylor 
[1991] had obtained evidence that, after controlling for initial absolute income and the 
expected income gains from migration, the propensity of households to participate in 
international migration was directly related to the households' initial relative 
deprivation. 
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Figure 9. Distribution of Skills: Self-Selection Model vs. Hispanic Immigration 
into the United States 
 
SkillsνL νH
Negatively-Selected 
Immigration Flow Positively-Selected 
Immigration Flow
SkillsνIL νP
Intermediate 
Selection
Brain Drain 
(Postgraduates) 
νIH
Self-
Selection 
Model
Mexican 
Experience
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical studies have, however, often rejected the predictions of the selection argument 
(Borjas [1994], Chiquiar and Hanson [2005]). The Mexico-US migration experience is 
useful to contrast those predictions. If one takes educational levels as a proxy for skill 
levels, then migrants into the US, while certainly much less educated than U.S. natives, 
are more educated than the average resident in Mexico. Individuals with 10–15 years of 
schooling form the most representative group of Mexican migrants in the United States. 
Whereas workers with low levels of education constitute the majority of the migrants in 
absolute terms, the greater relative loss occurs for higher educational groups.  
The own Borjas recognizes in further research that this is suggestive evidence against the 
hypothesis of negative selection of Mexican immigrants in terms of observable skill: 
“were Mexican immigrants in the United States paid according to Mexican skill prices, 
they would fall disproportionately in the middle and upper portions of Mexico’s wage 
distribution” (Borjas [1994]). Chiquiar and Hanson [2005] find the same result. According 
to Ross et al [2004], in 2000 55.8% of all Mexican immigrant men had not completed more 
that 9 years of school, compared to only 7.3% of U.S. natives. However, they compare 
favourably against residents of Mexico:  69.4% of male residents of Mexico had no more 
than 9 years of schooling. Beyond 9 years of education, Mexican immigrants outperform 
Mexican residents in every category except college graduates. 
The fact that immigrants from Mexico appear to be relatively higher-skilled individuals 
(intermediate selection) would be in principle surprising: the estimated returns to 
education are higher in Mexico than in the US (Borjas [1994]), whereas wage dispersion is 
higher (Chiquiar and Hanson, [2005]). This suggests that low-wage individuals from 
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Mexico would have the most to gain from crossing the border (as illustrated in Figure 9). 
Heterogeneity in migration costs is one way to reconcile these facts. People in the middle 
of the distribution (somewhat more educated) may be better able to cope with the 
migration process, they may have better access to migration networks in the U.S. or they 
may be less subject to credit constraints in financing migration. Also, besides greater 
migration costs, greater risk aversion among the low-skilled may make migration abroad 
relatively less attractive for this group.  
Orrenius and Zavodny [2005] also support the idea that migrants are not negatively 
selected with regard to education. They further argue that improvements in U.S. and 
Mexican economic conditions are associated with a decline in the average education of 
undocumented immigrants, while stricter border enforcement is associated with higher 
average skill levels. All these findings may also apply to other Latin American countries, 
especially those sending migrants into the Unites States.  
 
Figure 10. Hypothetical Income Distribution in Mexico and the U.S. 
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3.1.3 The Role of Extended Families and Networks 
The neo-classical approaches to labor migration highlight the individual incentives to 
move abroad under the premise of individual utility maximization. The New Economics 
of Labor Migration (NELM), which was initiated by Stark [1978] and was formalized in 
Stark and Bloom [1985], put more emphasis on the family unit within the migration 
process. This alternative approach does not mean that income differentials of the push-
pull fashion are not a key factor. The difference in the NELM is that income differentials 
may be necessary but not sufficient conditions. One of the Stark premises is that even 
though the entities that engage in migration are often individual agents, there is more to 
labor migration than individualistic optimization behavior. Following Mendola [2008], 
the NELM theory explains migration as an inter-temporal household strategy. The 
motivations behind migration are conceived in terms of imperfections in credit and risk 
markets, whereby having a migrant member working elsewhere is a family strategy to 
manage uncertainty, diversify the income portfolio and alleviate liquidity constraints 
through remittances. Accordingly, the migrant (both temporary and permanent) is part 
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of a spatially extended household that acts collectively to reduce idiosyncratic risks by 
maintaining cooperation over long distances (examples of cooperation channels are the 
process of remittances and the possibility of inheritance left by people at the home 
country). 
Determinants of Migration 
Unit of Analysis 
Individual Household/Family Institutions 
Harris –Todaro  
Push - Pull 
Stark 
New Economics of Migration 
Marxism 
Structuralism 
 
The familial implicit contract, according to this theory, aspires at increasing family 
income and reducing the exposure to risks by investing in migration. Moreover, 
migration is costly and, in a context of imperfect credit markets, liquidity constraints may 
be an obstacle for many single individuals to move abroad. This situation re-enforces the 
need of migration to be determined within the family unit, with the financial support to 
afford movement costs.      
Authors like Ilahi and Jafarey [1999] explore how far family arrangements for the finance 
of costs of migration are altruistically motivated or if they should be seen as informal 
credit arrangements. Following the principles of the NELM, the family would finance the 
costs of migration in the expectation of receiving a benefit into the future, either in the 
form of higher income or in the form of protection against economic downturns, through 
the possible reception of remittances. The discussion of altruism versus self-interested 
motives is, therefore, also relevant in the literature on the determinants of remittances, 
which is not surprising given the strong inter-relationship between the processes of 
migration and remittance.  
The authors also test whether the high initial costs of migration encourage the 
development of kin networks in source countries. The fact that individual migrants may 
borrow from the extended family in order to offset those costs could lead to greater 
obligations on the part of this migrant to help extended family members joining him 
overseas.  
Social networks are likely to play an important role in mitigating the hazards of crossing 
the border, with friends and relatives with previous migrant experience often 
accompanying new immigrants across the border. Munshi [2003] finds that individuals 
with larger networks are more likely to be employed and to hold higher paying jobs. Net 
migration costs, as proposed by Carrington et al [1996], become hence endogenous to the 
migration process; regions with higher migration rates may form a migration network, 
which reduces the costs of future migration and eventually facilitate the movement of 
even more residents from this region. Migration is therefore likely to have different 
effects on inequality at different levels of a village's migration history. This has policy 
implications in national governments in source countries, especially regarding the 
focalization of anti-poverty programs. According to these possible scenarios, public cash 
transfers should be, under some circumstances, targeted to some regions with less access 
to networks and more probability of staying behind.  
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 3.2 Return migration and Optimal Duration Abroad 
The emigration of workers from poor to rich countries is frequently regarded as a relief 
for labor markets in many developing economies. But given than an important share of 
that migration is temporal and not permanent (Dustmann [1997]), the return of those 
migrants to their home country poses further challenges to the home country economy.   
Labor migration has traditionally been treated as a strategy to increase the individual 
level of income and that of the family. Under a neoclassical economic perspective, 
persisting geographical differences in wage levels are the main drivers of migration 
flows. Simple neo-classical models cannot, therefore, provide an explanation for the 
persisting flows of return migration from high-income to low-income countries. 
Additional factors must therefore be considered.  
Following Borjas and Bratsberg [1996], return migration can be either planned before 
migration or resolved once migrants reside abroad. The existence of an optimal location 
strategy is an example where return migration is contemplated since the first migration 
decision. According to the target income hypothesis, workers reside in the host country for 
a few years and then return after accumulating a target level of wealth.  This explanation 
makes particularly sense in the case that liquidity-constrained individuals wish to invest 
in the source country but there are capital market imperfections (Lindstrom [1996,] 
Mesnard [2004]).   
Spontaneous return decisions are, in contrast, driven by changing economic and social 
circumstances in both source and receiving countries. One first possibility is the 
disappointment hypothesis, in which return migration flows may result from mistakes in 
the initial migration decision (actual outcomes experienced in the host country's labor 
market may differ from the expected outcomes that guided the immigration decision). A 
more accepted premise in economics, though, is that workers act as rational economic 
agents and maximize life-cycle utility taking into account changes in diverse variables. 
They are often called in the literature ‘neo-classical migrants’. In each period of time ‘neo-
classical migrants’ decide to locate wherever benefits are higher. Models that seek to 
explain return migrations in a life-cycle context vary in their explanations. Djajic and 
Milbourne [1988] explain return migration by assuming that migrants have a stronger 
preference for consumption at home than abroad. They suggest that this assumption 
results in behavior that seems to be consistent with the fact that migrants have a higher 
savings rate while abroad and their rate of consumption rises upon returning to the 
homeland. Hill [1987] also shows that migration may be temporary and repetitive if the 
migrant has a preference for certain locations. This mobility pattern would allow, 
therefore, that some workers attain higher utility than if the migration decision was 
permanent. Dustmann [2003] bases also on location preferences, but he proposes two 
additional motives: (i) accumulation of human capital abroad which is only earnings-
effective back home; (ii) higher purchasing power of savings at home.  These motives are 
consistent with individual utility maximization where returning home is optimal, despite 
differences in absolute income levels.  
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Regarding the time spent abroad, distinguishing between ‘neo-classical’ and ‘target-
income’ migrants makes a difference in the optimal length of stay. The first type of 
migrants  choose the length of stay overseas that balances the marginal benefit from 
higher savings overseas (and thus higher lifetime consumption) against the marginal 
utility cost of overseas work (Dustmann [2003]). Target-income migrants, in contrast, stay 
abroad the time needed to accumulate a target wealth level. For these reasons, both types 
of migrants may respond very differently to changes in overseas economic conditions. 
For ‘neo-classical’ migrants, improved economic conditions in host countries, say, 
increased wages, can lead to longer overseas stays (as long as substitution effects 
dominate any income effects). For target-income agents, by contrast, improved economic 
conditions should lead to shorter overseas stays, as migrants reach their earnings goals 
more quickly. 
Return migration may also be influenced more by networks than by economic 
considerations. In addition to its influence in increasing the probability of migration by 
reducing its cost, social networks may increase the probability of permanent settlement 
(Reyes [1997)]. Prospective immigrants can count on earlier migrants for information, 
transportation, housing, and in some cases even employment. Every new migrant 
expands the social network and reduces the risk for all other potential migrants. The 
maturation of migration networks is often associated with longer stays.  
It is, therefore, important to determine the motives to return for different types of people, 
since the diverse explanations frequently yield contradictory predictions. Under the 
disappointment theory, for instance, those who fail to meet their expectations return. 
Under the target-income theory, those who save enough funds return, which suggests 
people who fail are the ones who stay. Policy actions are, as a consequence, likely to yield 
unexpected results if one does not keep in mind such variety of individual motivations.   
Borjas and Bratsberg [1996] complemented the return migration literature by linking this 
process to the initial migration decision and the heterogeneity of individuals in terms of 
skills. They argue that the initial selectivity in the process of migration is re-enforced 
with return migration. If migration flows are initially positively-selected (i.e. composed 
of workers with higher –than-average skills), then the return migration flow is composed 
of the least skilled immigrants. The whole premise is based on the returns to skills. 
Intuitively, it is the highly skilled who gain the most by residing abroad and will stay 
there even if economic conditions improve in the home country. If migration was instead 
initially negatively-selected, and considering that the rate of return to skills is higher in 
the source country, then the most skilled have little incentive to migrate abroad.  And 
even though the immigrant flow is relatively unskilled, it is the most skilled in this self-
selected sample who find it optimal to become return migrants. According to the authors, 
since it is the marginal immigrants who leave, the immigrants who remain in the United 
States are the ‘best of the best’ if there is initially positive selection, and the ‘worst of the 
worst’ if the selection is negative.  
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Figure 11. Probability of Remaining over time, by education 
 
Source: Reyes (1997) using data from the Mexican Migration Project 
For the case of Mexico, for instance, Reyes [1997] reports that the rate of return was 
higher for the poorly educated, for low-wage earners, and for undocumented 
immigrants. If we consider that diverse authors, like the own Borjas in previous studies, 
have suggested that migration from Mexico into the United States is relatively positively-
selected (or intermediately-selected, which is another classification they use for implying 
that Mexican migrants are relatively a bit more skilled with respect to their co-nationals 
who stay at home), then the two findings combined would imply that return migrants 
are, in any case, what I would define as the ‘worst of the relatively higher skilled’.  
The problem with the results of Borjas and Bartsberg [1996] is that they are highly 
dependent on the assumption of fixed skills. It disregards the fact that migrants may 
accumulate skills while residing abroad and a small increase in those skills may represent 
a bigger return at home. In such a case, it would be interesting to document what types 
of individuals acquire more skills and whether relatively unskilled migrants eventually 
close the gap with more skilled fellows.  It would be interesting to get more in depth into 
the return migration of workers from Central America and get equivalent figures.  
 
3.2.1 Return Migration and Development 
The probability of returning has implications in some key variables. Galor and Stark 
[1990], for instance, argue theoretically that the existence of a positive probability of 
getting back home results in migrants saving more than comparable native born. Part of 
those resources are saved at the destination country whereas the rest may be remitted 
back home. It is important to determine the nature of those savings, whether they serve 
for precautionary motives, in case of risks like unemployment, or if they are part of a life-
cycle accumulation for future consumption and investment.  
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One must also take account of the potential problems of endogeneity. Mesnard [2004], for 
instance, have documented from the African migration experience that migrants who 
invest after returning to their country have accumulated more savings and stayed longer 
abroad than salaried return migrants. A central question is the causality of the 
relationship, this is, whether higher savings induce afterwards to the involvement in self-
employment in own business or if individuals with a preference for self-employment, but 
credit-constrained, self-select for longer stays abroad to accumulate enough wealth. 
Depending on which hypothesis is accurate, different policy measures may be optimal.  
In particular, Latin American governments, especially in small Central American and 
Caribbean countries, may be interested in detonating the entrepreneurship capacity of 
those individuals that due to credit constraints decided to migrate. If it is the case that a 
higher accumulation of assets and the time spent abroad detonate the entrepreneurial 
spirit of individuals and increase their willingness of investing in the home country, then 
the governments may have the interest to encourage longer stays abroad. Poverty 
alleviation programs that relax credit constraints and give individuals the chance to 
move temporarily abroad do not seem such a bad idea in this case. Also, if the causality 
implies that higher savings (maybe in the form of remittances) lead to higher prospects of 
starting up new business, another possibility is a policy that encourages the 
establishment of financial instruments for increasing savings derived from remittances.   
If, on the contrary, more business-prone individuals are self-selected, then governments 
would have the incentive to repatriate them.  In principle, policy measures that overcome 
credit market constraints in the home country could be expected to reduce migratory 
flows of the most entrepreneurial people, as well as reducing the average length of 
migration for those who do leave and have the intention of starting new business in the 
home country. Moreover, Mesnard suggests the possibility of further reactions to policy: 
if credit market imperfections are reduced, migrant workers that initially contemplated 
salaried work at their return may change their intended occupation from wage-
employment to self-employment, which would encourage the reception of remittances 
aimed at productive investments.  
In such scenario, programs aimed at overcoming credit market imperfections may be a 
better bet that anti-poverty transfers. Public loans or assistance funds conditioned on 
investment projects may be better suited for economic growth. The only drawback of 
micro-financing is that it may benefit the better-off and marginalize the poor.  
 
3.2.2 Life-Cycle, Retirement and Return Migration 
Since return migration is a dynamic problem embedded within the life-cycle of migrants, 
it necessarily raises inquiries regarding migrants’ future consumption possibilities, take 
these place in the host country or at home, and the possibility of leaving the labor market 
at some stage.  According to the life-cycle theory, each individual with perfect foresight 
will save during working life in order to finance consumption once she is no longer 
working. However, this simply rarely happens in reality either because the future is 
uncertain (i.e. wages, unemployment or disability status) or because individuals face 
Page | 20  
 
difficulties in the process of planning. In any case, people might prefer to trade resources 
between contingent states of nature than across time. In other words, individuals in 
many countries insure against those risks, either through private insurance or through 
social arrangements. Each individual retirement will then be determined either by 
disability or by an optimizing behavior, i.e., when the benefits of retirement, which may 
come in the form of pension benefits and/or a higher preference for leisure, offset the 
opportunity cost of leaving the labor force.  
One salient characteristic of migrants from Latin America is that they are frequently 
informal workers and thus not covered by any sort of formal protection scheme, either at 
home or in the receiving country. Migration may act, on the one hand, as a form of 
insurance against undeveloped markets and economic downturns in the home country. 
Also, the possibility of being entitled to insurance schemes and protection systems 
abroad may shape migration and return migration. A high degree of mobility, on the 
other hand, may be at the same time the responsible for the lack of eligibility to welfare 
benefits in either country. Whether the lack of protection against risks is a cause or a 
consequence of migration is not yet clear. Even if migrant workers do value the access to, 
say, pension schemes and health care coverage, it is not straightforward that it is relevant 
in their decision to move abroad or to return home.  
Migrants may be of different types: (i) myopic migrants may be driven by current 
differences in levels of income, with no concern about the future; (ii) strategic migrants 
may be driven by the probable gains in the accumulation of savings/assets, either for 
precautionary purposes or in the form of life-cycle savings for future consumption.  
Among strategic migrants, those with an income target will seek to accumulate enough 
wealth for financing retirement consumption or for financing new business at home 
capable of expanding consumption possibilities into the future. They are less likely to be 
particularly concerned with protection schemes in their migration decision. Life-cycle 
migrants, or ‘neo-classical’ migrants, in contrast, will locate wherever the benefits are 
greater than costs, including the retirement phase. Those benefits may include the access 
to protection schemes. Life-cycle migrants may settle permanently abroad if their 
purchasing power, including also the retirement period, is greater abroad than in the 
home country (and big enough to offset any location preference).  
Determining the sorts of motivations that drive migrants is a key factor for the design of 
public policies, especially regarding the development of financial instruments for the 
investment of remittances in productive projects and for pension and health care 
protection schemes. For some types of individuals institutions may play a more central 
role and their effects on the initial migration decision, the time spend overseas, the 
decision to return home, may rely on specific institutional characteristics such as 
entitlements to social benefits.    
 
3.3 Institutions and Public Policies 
According to Haan [1999], not all migration decisions should be expect to be a result of 
economic-thinking decisions of individuals, or even families. In a critical survey, the 
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author argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the institutions that determine 
migration. Orthodox theories assume that migrants act individually according to a 
rationality of economic self interest. In Harris-Todaro’s framework, the decision to 
migrate would be determined by wage differences (plus the expected probability of 
employment at the destination). But economic models tend to isolate economic decision-
making, and consequently do not analyze the political and social context in which these 
decisions are made. Neoclassical models frequently lack institutional content.  
 
3.3.1 Immigration Policy. 
We have commented above about the empirical evidence that flows of migrants into the 
United States may be driven more by ‘pull’ factors (i.e. by economic variables in the 
destination country). Mayda [2007] suggest that the importance of pull factors is 
determined by the demand side of migration, this is, immigration policy. However, 
although part of the increase in immigration in recent decades can be attributable to 
changes in U.S. immigration policy, such policy has been virtually unchanged in the last 
twenty years, which is the period that has witnessed the greatest increase in migration 
inflows.  
Prior to 1965, immigration was guided by the national-origins quota system, based on the 
censual number of foreign-born residents of each nationality. The 1965 Amendments to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (and subsequent revisions) repealed the national 
origin restrictions, increased the number of available visas, and made family ties to U.S. 
residents the key factor that determines whether an applicant is admitted into the 
country. As a consequence of both the 1965 Amendments and of major changes in 
economic and political conditions in the source countries relative to the United States, the 
national origin mix of the immigrant flow changed substantially.  
There were two additional major pieces of legislation. The 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) gave amnesty to three million illegal immigrants but introduced two 
of the main policies aimed at limiting the flow of additional illegal workers: (i) a system 
of sanctions to employers accepting illegal immigrants and (ii) the intensification of 
border patrols. With the 1990 Immigration Act, the entry of an additional 150,000 legal 
immigrants annually was permitted and family reunification was retained as the main 
immigration criteria, although with significant increases in employment-related 
immigration. 
Thus, in theory the demand for illegal workers was officially eliminated since 1986. The 
flow of undocumented migrants increased, though, in unprecedented numbers 
thereafter. This suggests either that the supply side, i.e. the incentives of migrants, is 
more powerful that the demand side, or that the demand side is still positive and the 
United States tolerates a certain number of foreign workers. Nowadays that the economic 
conditions may put more pressure for the government to restrict migration, the demand 
side may decline even without any change in policy, only by the enforcement of the 
current law. More powerful that immigration policy, however, may be welfare policy ( 
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i.e. the access of migrants to public benefits) insofar it affects migrants’ economic 
incentives.     
 
3.3.2 Welfare Policy. 
In 1996 immigration and social welfare policies were fused in the United States. The 1996 
Welfare Reform Act limited the eligibility of immigrant households to receive financial 
support from the Government and set time limits on the receipt of transfer payments. 
Authors like Borjas have described in several papers the particularities of this reform, 
and some that followed thereafter, and have explored their impacts in a series of 
variables (see Borjas [1999], [2002], [2003]). Access to welfare benefits and protection 
schemes may be at the core of the decision to migrate, the duration of stay abroad, and to 
determine the amount of remittances. 
The initial reform adversely affected an important share of migrant workers and the 
conditions were gradually softened. In August of 1997 Congress restored the eligibility of 
most immigrants who were already present in 1996 to receive certain disability 
payments. At the same time, individual States, which had been granted with this 
initiative a new authority to deny public benefits to legal immigrants, generally chose not 
to, and continued to extend medical assistance and welfare benefits to immigrants. In 
June of 1998, moreover, Congress voted to restore eligibility for food subsidies to those 
immigrants who were elderly, disabled, or under 18 and were in the U.S. when the law 
passed. 
The initiative initially barred most immigrants, those already in the United States at the 
time the law was enacted and future immigrants, from receiving cash assistance from the 
Supplemental Security Income3 and federal food stamps, as a subsidy for poor families. 
Eligibility was later restored for the elderly, disabled and legal migrants under 18 years 
old. The law also barred new migrants for 5 years from receiving any “federal means-
tested benefits,” including Medicaid (which covers essential health care costs care for 
people otherwise unable to pay). Illegal migrants were disqualified from all “federal 
public benefits”. At the State level, however, all current immigrants, including those 
illegal, were later entitled to specific substitutive programs.  
Despite these efforts to blunt welfare reform's effects, many immigrants still lost 
eligibility for public benefits. Only a small fraction of the immigrants who lost eligibility 
for federal food stamps by August 1997 had their eligibility restored by the States. Like 
the federal restorations, many State programs left out working age adults. Since SSI is a 
program for the elderly and disabled, nearly all current immigrants regained their 
eligibility for SSI. But by following the SSI population “model,” the Government left out 
the largest group of needy immigrant food stamp recipients: working age adults. The 5-
year bar on means-tested benefits restricts immigrants' access to the programs they need 
                                                            
3 The program is aimed at helping the aged, blind, and disabled.  
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most at the time their need is greatest.4 It also left out a significant subset of the elderly 
non-disabled population: those aged 60–65 years and those who turned 65 after August 
22, 1996. 
Perhaps, the clearest line drawn by welfare reform is not the one separating legal 
immigrants from citizens, but that dividing noncitizens in the United States as of August 
22, 1996 from those arriving afterward, the latter being barred from receiving benefits 
such as Medicaid (for a period of 5 years since they arrive) and from SSI and federal food 
stamps until they naturalize. In contrast to their relatively generous treatment of current 
immigrants, most States followed the federal government's lead and did not provide 
substitute benefits to new immigrants. By limiting the access of non-citizens to benefits, 
welfare reform introduced a strong new incentive to naturalize. The power of this 
incentive was especially strongly felt among working age immigrants ineligible for food 
stamps and new immigrants arriving after August 22, 1996, whose eligibility for all major 
benefit programs was suddenly conditioned on naturalization. 
 
3.3.3 Portability of Social Benefits  
An additional policy in the area of access to welfare benefits is the portability of 
entitlements. Take the experience of Mexican migrants in the United States; about a half 
is illegal but workers do frequently pay social security taxes. Moreover, under the Social 
Security Act, all earnings from covered employment in the United States had typically 
counted towards earning social security benefits, regardless of the lawful presence of the 
worker, his or her citizenship status, or country of residence. Moreover, the U.S. allows 
the export of pensions. Immigrants became entitled to benefits from unauthorized work 
if they can prove that the earnings and related contributions belong to them (and as long 
as they met the coverage credit threshold of 10 years). However, they could not collect 
such benefits unless they are either legally present in the U.S. or living in a country 
where SSA is authorized to pay them their benefits. Mexico is such a country. Although 
unclaimed social security contributions in the US are significant (Holzman et al [2005] 
estimate that US$35 billion have been contributed by or on behalf of undocumented 
Mexican migrants), many Mexican workers disqualified from receiving benefits in the 
U.S. have been doing so in Mexico for many years (according to Ross [2005], among 
migrants who receive a pension, more than 30% earn US social security). This may have 
encouraged return migration. This scenario may also have affected migrants from other 
Latin America countries, depending on the type of arrangements the SSA had with the 
corresponding source country. In 2003, however, the Social Security Protection Act 
explicitly prohibits foreigners from applying for Social Security benefits from abroad on 
or after January 1, 2004, based on work they did while in the US illegally. This will surely 
bring new behavioral changes in the patterns of return migration among illegal workers.   
                                                            
4 Immigrants' incomes are lower during their first years after arrival than they are after being in the 
U.S. for 5 or 10 years (See Borjas [1999]). Although new immigrants' sponsors have pledged to 
support them, paying for health care for an uninsured immigrant who falls ill can be very 
expensive. 
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A separate policy that is specifically relevant for Mexican-born migrants in the United 
States is the sign in June 2004 of a totalization agreement of pensions between both 
countries (Bovbjerg [2004]).5 Under a totalization agreement countries recognize each 
other’s pension credits. Such an agreement would allow to sum years worked in the US 
and Mexico. This would allow more migrant workers to qualify for pension benefits: still 
today a migrant who worked for less than 10 years in Mexico and less than 10 years in 
the U.S. does not have an entitlement to a pension in either country. With the new 
proposed law the minimum requirements are 52 weeks of contribution into the Mexican 
system, six quarters into the U.S. system, 500 weeks of combined contributions for the 
Mexican part of the pension, and 10 years of combined contribution for the U.S. pension. 
Each country only pays the pro rata share of the pension and benefits will be available 
only to workers who obtained legal status before returning to Mexico.  
This type of policy would entice migrants to remain in the U.S. for the 10 years it takes to 
vest for U.S. Social Security (versus 24 in Mexico) should they be agents who seek to 
maximize life-time - and retirement income. Whether migrants would then settle 
permanently or not has yet to be investigated. The portability of pensions for legal 
workers together with the law limiting access to claiming pensions to illegal ones is likely 
to change the composition of workers who return to Mexico, with higher proportions of 
legal workers returning home. This seems in principle good news to the Mexican State; 
illegal migrants, who are no longer entitled to any pension benefit, would probably 
demand resources from Mexican safety programs after returning.  
Enhancing portability of long-term social security benefits may also be a useful tool for 
host countries to encourage migrants to participate in the formal sector (and pay taxes) 
and discourage irregular migration. A migrant worker who is certain of returning to her 
home country at some point but who will not be able to keep her benefits faces high 
incentives to avoid paying social security contributions during her stay in the host 
country.  
Access to health care is also a relevant factor. In addition to its probable effect on 
migrants’ decisions to save and return home it also have important fiscal implications. 
Consider again the Mexican experience. Returning Mexican migrants from the US are 
reported to be a burden for the Mexican health system as these people have paid few 
taxes and contributions into the Mexican public coffers during the course of their career, 
but enjoy free access to first-level health services like emergency treatment while in 
Mexico. The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) has responded, however, by 
offering health insurance policies for Mexicans who live and work abroad to insure them 
and their family members while staying in Mexico, or family members who live in 
Mexico. The rates are age dependent and the policies can be bought for every family 
member, independent of their status (migrant or not, legal or undocumented). The 
government response to the fiscal challenges is likely to affect migrants’ behaviour. Will 
                                                            
5 The agreement is awaiting the U.S. President’s signature. Once signed the agreement, which 
would be done without congressional vote. 
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migrants save more? Will they buy such insurance at all? Will private health care 
expenditure increase? 
 Return migrants might qualify for Medicare in the US, and stay covered regardless of 
the country of residence (as long as they continue to contribute to the system). The 
problem is that few migrants satisfy the requirement of 40 quarters to qualify for 
Medicare either because they return before 10 years or because they are illegal. A 
proposal for establishing an agreement for the portability of health care benefits does not 
in principle look beneficial for the home country. Following Holzmann [2005], such a 
policy would imply important actuarial considerations: migrant workers, who are 
typically young (and healthy), would pay a significant amount of contributions to the 
public health system of the host country. This makes migrants on average net 
contributors to the public health system of the host country. After returning home, when 
older and with a higher need of health care coverage, migrants may contribute to the 
public health system of the home country for some time before retiring and spending the 
rest of life as net beneficiaries of the home country’s health system. Migration flows are 
clearly asymmetric, with developing countries sending more young net contributors 
abroad than they receive, and receiving more net beneficiaries than they send abroad. 
This “youth drain” may result, as we will show in the sections about the effects of 
migration below, on a burden for the public health systems of migrant-sending 
developing countries.  
 
3.4 Effects of Migration in Source Countries 
A great part of the literature has concentrated on determining the effects of migration on 
destination countries. The more frequently studied topic is the effect of immigration on 
labor markets, through the possible depression of wages and the change in the 
composition of skills.  Dustmann et al [2005] summarize what the literature has found on 
the effect of immigration on developed (host) countries: although immigration has strong 
effects on relative supplies of different skill groups, local labor market outcomes for low 
skilled natives are not much affected by these relative supply shocks. Another piece of 
the literature has focused on the access of immigrants to welfare benefits and the 
potential fiscal impacts. The common debate is whether the immigration of young 
workers, by reducing old-age dependency ratios, can play a role in overcoming the 
problems that an ageing population brings to welfare systems. Authors like Razin and 
Sadka [1999] and Storesletten [2000] show that in a dynamic framework the presence of 
immigration is beneficial for the host country’s public finances, even in the case where 
immigrants may be net beneficiaries of the welfare state in the long-run.  
Much less studied is the effect on source countries. Variables affected include: wages, 
education, labor supply and employment patterns, inequality and public finances. These 
effects are transmitted by three channels: (i) the initial migration movement, (ii) the 
possibility of return migration and (iii) remittances.  
Although the process of remitting money back home is itself one of the outcomes derived 
from international migration, it may generate, besides the direct repercussions of the own 
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migration process, further separate impacts in home countries. In fact, it is actually 
impossible to talk about the development impacts of migration on source countries 
without touching its interrelation with remittances.  
Today, there is not a consensus about the relationship between remittances and 
development. On the one hand, a group of scholars emphasize the negative role of 
remittances. This pessimistic view is associated with the idea that lucrative migration 
activities drain migrant sending areas of their human capital (brain drain). They also 
argue that remittances generate "Dutch Disease” problems, a disincentive to work and 
high social costs. On the other hand, some researchers highlighted the positive impact of 
remittances associated with the idea that remittances increase disposable income and 
demand for local goods and services and play a vital role in developing local capital 
markets and infrastructure. In addition remittances may have a positive impact over the 
balance of payments, poverty, income distribution and investment opportunities6. 
 Therefore, on one side of the debate, recent literature has emphasized the possible 
negative effects of an appreciation of the real exchange rate as a consequence of a high 
inflows of foreign currency that remittances generate (know as “Dutch disease” 
phenomenon). Several authors (including the World Bank, 2006) reckon that a higher real 
exchange rate will increase export prices of these countries and they will therefore lose 
competitiveness. The ultimate effect of this phenomenon would be a decrease in 
economic growth (and not an increase as has been suggested above). Others remittance 
and development critics argue that people with income coming from abroad simply will 
chose to withdraw from the labor market, and it will result in less investment in 
production as declining labor force participation drives up wages.  
In this debate, an additional part of the literature emphasizes the social cost of 
international migration. These costs are associated with the excessive use of alcohol and 
drugs in immigrant’s communities; the growth of immigrant’s criminal activities when 
they return to their original countries (due to the difficulty of finding a job upon his 
return); and the social costs in the migration process (particularly when the migration is 
illegal).  
On the other side of the debate, some scholars argue that we might expect a positive 
relationship between remittances and growth for countries with the complementary 
assets to take advantage of the infusion of capital. This would be the case when 
remittances are invested in new business back in the home country7.  
But even where remittances do not provide macroeconomic stimulus, at the 
microeconomic level of individuals they may alleviate poverty and insure households 
against economic downturns, taking a burden off fragile government institutions. 
Indeed, remittances have been found to be an important vehicle against poverty in many 
                                                            
6 For a complete review of the debate between Migration and Development see Page J. & Plaza S. 
(2006) and for examples of Central American countries see Reklitis, George (2003). 
7 Fajnzylber et al (2006) point out that remittances have a positive impact on growth, half of which 
is explained by raising investment. 
Page | 27  
 
countries. Remittances have the potential to contribute to economic development by 
reducing poverty and providing savings for capital accumulation in the country of origin 
(Osili [2007]). Moreover, the impact of remittances tends to be stronger in smaller 
countries, which allegedly are also poorer and have a less diversified productive 
structure. 
Since there is an open debate about migration and remittances impact on development, 
the topic deserves, therefore, its own discussion. In the sections that follow we first 
address the current literature on the determinants of remittances. We then get into the 
effects of the interrelated migration/remittance phenomenon, including the possibility of 
return migration, on variables such as wages, labor supply, inequality and public 
finances.     
 
3.4.1 Determinants of Remittances 
Workers’ remittances have become a major source of external development finance, 
providing a convenient angle from which to approach the migration phenomenon. 
Migrants' remittances currently rank as the second-largest source of external inflows to 
developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI). As depicted in Figure 13, the 
role of remittances as a generator of external resources is particularly significant in some 
Central American economies.  Despite their economic magnitude, transfers between 
international migrants and their households of origin remain a relatively understudied 
aspect of international resource flows.  
Figure 12. Remittances, Exports and International Aid, % of GDP 2005 
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Much of the early work on migrants' remittances suggests that transfers are sent 
primarily to help meet the consumption needs of the origin household or to provide 
economic support during periods of income shocks (Okonkwo [2007]). However, recent 
evidence also reveals the significant economic potential of remittances that are invested 
in the origin community. In particular, migrants' remittances may finance investments in 
the country of origin in the form of land and housing acquisition, financial assets, and 
microenterprises (Dustmann and Kirchkamp[ 2002]; Mesnard [2004]; Woodruff and 
Zenteno [2007]. Because migrants' savings can contribute significantly to capital 
accumulation in the country of origin, both origin and host country governments have 
begun to show interest in this aspect of international remittances. 
The first motivation to remit that comes to mind is simply that migrants care of those left 
behind: spouses, children, parents, and members of larger kinship and social circles. 
Since the seminal work by Lucas and Stark [1985], however, several authors have pointed 
out the incapability of the pure altruism model to explain the pattern of remittances: 
whereas altruism predicts higher remittances flowing to lower-income households, 
evidence often show the opposite, i.e., more educated migrants with wealthier families 
are those who precisely remit more (although Amuedo-Dorantes et al [2005], find the 
opposite for the Mexican Case). Thereafter, a wide range of motives besides altruism 
have been proposed in the increasing literature (see Box 1). 
Following the premises of the NELM, migration is now recognized to occur in the context 
of informal familial arrangements where self-interest prevails. Although remittances may 
be regarded, under this context, as a means to “buy” services from the family, such as 
taking care of the migrant’s assets and relatives at home (see Cox et al [1998]), more 
complex implicit “contracts” have been suggested in the literature and where remittances 
play a central role (Rapoport [2005]). Following Lucas and Stark [1985] remittances are 
part of an inter-temporal, mutually beneficial contractual arrangement between migrants 
and home. Two components underlie those arrangements: investment and risk, with 
benefits in the realms of risk-diversification, consumption smoothing, and 
intergenerational financing of investments. Examples of risks include price fluctuations, 
insecurity of land tenancy, unemployment, disability. The main argument is that the 
institution of the family provides individuals with risk-sharing opportunities which may 
not be available in the open insurance markets.  
The household, on the one hand, may be willing to invest in the migration of a family 
member, say by covering migration costs, in the expectation of being insured against 
economic slumps via remittances. The migrant is, on the other hand, willing to give such 
support in exchange of future financial assistance in case of unemployment or other 
eventualities. One can view periodic payments to family members back home as the 
premia that insures that immigrants will receive support from their family should they 
return home. This is an example of a mutually beneficial family-provided insurance 
arrangement.8  
                                                            
8 Some level of mutual trust is required since elements of these arrangements are not legally 
enforceable.  
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Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006] envision, however, a separate avenue by which 
immigrants may insure against income risks. Migrant workers may decide to face future 
possible eventualities, including old-age consumption, with their own accumulated 
wealth. One vehicle is to send remittances for investment in fixed capital such as land or 
a house. The careful maintenance of those investments may be in charge of the family 
back home (where relatives act as trust-worthy agents). Remittances may also be invested 
in new businesses. These are examples of migrants’ self-insurance via the accumulation 
of resources during the life-cycle (in the form of physical or financial assets). Risks faced 
by migrants are therefore covered by a combination of family insurance and self-
insurance, which consequently implies a mix of the insurance and the investment 
motives. 9 
Box 1. Motives to Remit 
Altruism: Migrants care of those left behind: spouses, children, parents, and members of larger 
kinship and social circles. 
Re-payment of past loans: Since migration is costly, and with the presence of imperfect credit 
markets, migration is frequently financed with informal family loans. Remittances may represent 
a re-payment of those loans. 
Exchange: Remittances “buy” various types of services such as taking care of relatives or assets at 
home. 
Family-provided insurance arrangements: this type of insurance runs in two directions; 
whereas migrants may insure the remaining members of the family against drops in rural 
incomes, they may receive future assistance against unemployment, disability and other risks. 
Migrant investment and self-insurance: Migrants wish to invest in assets at the home country 
and ensure their careful maintenance (where relatives act as trust-worthy agents). Those 
investments may be regarded as migrants’ self-insurance against future economic eventualities or 
as resources to be available for future consumption.  
 
These types of motives are based, at the end, on the economic notion of incentives. But 
according to Chami et al [2005] these arrangements may not be as self-interested as they 
first appear. Even if the remittance arrangements are truly self-interested, the self-
enforcing mechanism on which they depend may actually be altruism—that is, the 
migrant will live up to her obligations because she cares about the family members who 
are the counterparties to the agreement. Altruism between family members appears, 
consequently, to be a good benchmark to use when modeling the interaction of causes 
and effects of remittances. 
                                                            
9 Chami et al (2005) further divides the literature into two main strands: the “endogenous 
migration” approach, and the “portfolio” approach. The first is based on the economics of the 
family, which includes but is not limited to motivations based on altruism. The second isolates the 
decision to remit from the decision to migrate, and likewise avoids issues of family ties. In this 
view, the migrant earns income and decides how to allocate savings between host country assets 
and home country assets. Remittances are a result of deciding to invest in home country assets. 
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For the case of Latin America there are some studies that address the determinants of 
international remittances. Funkhouser [1995] compares remittance patterns for El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. According to his numbers, nearly twice as many Salvadorian 
households receive remittances than Nicaraguans. The role of observable characteristics 
in explaining differences in the level of remittances in this study is not large, even 
accounting for the self-selection in the decision to remit. The difference is instead 
explained by differences in the behavioral coefficients and by differences in the self-
selection bias of those who remit out of the pool of emigrants between the two countries. 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006], test the insurance hypothesis for the case of 
remittances received by families in Mexico. They find that increases in income risk 
significantly raises both the propensity and the proportion of labor earnings sent home 
for family-provided insurance and for self-insurance.   
 
      Figure 13. Remittances as insurance 
 
Source: Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) 
 
The insurance strand of the literature on remittances remains, however, relatively 
understudied despite its importance for developing countries, which frequently lack of 
formal protection systems. Migrants and families could potentially overcome income 
losses derived from risks like unemployment and old-age by allocating a share of the 
income earned abroad to activities that achieve a higher return and expand, 
consequently, consumption possibilities into the future. One potential contribution in this 
field, from the point of view of economic analysis, is to propose a concrete model 
showing that migrants can be significantly better off inverting into savings vehicles, such 
as pension funds, than under current informal family insurance schemes. Of course the 
results will depend on the assumptions made about the level of altruism.    
At the macroeconomic level, it would be interesting to address empirically the 
importance of altruism, as opposed to the insurance hypothesis, via the estimation of 
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gravity equations. The correlation of aggregate remittances with GDP levels in both 
source and destination countries can give us a gauge of the importance of altruistic 
motives. Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz [2006] have performed similar exercises for some Asian 
countries and find that remittances do not seem to increase in the wake of a natural 
disaster and appear aligned with the business cycle in the home country, suggesting that 
remittances may not play a major role in limiting vulnerability to shocks. The gravity 
equation can also be related to the determinants of the initial migration decision. Freund 
and Spatafora [2008] find the stock of migrants to be the main determinant of 
remittances. Nevertheless, one of the crucial issues in the migration literature is that 
migrants are not a random sample of the underlying native population of home 
countries. While the number of migrants abroad affects the level of remittances, the 
desire to remit also influences the migration level. An aggregate empirical study of 
migration and remittance flows must be performed simultaneously, possibly employing 
a two-stage methodology.  
 
3.4.2 Emigration, Educational Levels and Wages in the Source Country 
The common wisdom recognizes that, under certain conditions, poor regions can 
improve their economic position by exporting workers to wealthier regions. According to 
Carrington et al [1996] this occurs because reducing labor supply increases wages for 
workers staying in the home country and because migrants remit a substantial fraction of 
their newly higher income.  
Mishra [2007] examines empirically the effect of Mexican emigration to the United States 
on wages and finds that indeed emigration has a strong and positive effect on Mexican 
wages. There is also evidence, however, of increasing wage inequality insofar the impact 
on wages is greater for higher wage earners (those with 12–15 years of schooling). 
Hanson [2005] finds, for instance,  that emigration rates appear to be highest among 
individuals with earnings in the top half of the Mexican wage distribution (which is 
consistent with positive selection of emigrants in terms of observable skill). Controlling 
for regional differences in observable characteristics and for initial regional differences in 
earnings, the distribution of male earnings in high-migration states shifted ‘to the right’ 
relative to low-migration states.  
Wage levels and standards of living may also be increased via the indirect effect of 
educational levels. Authors such as Mayr and Peri [2008] argue that, if migration is 
initially positively-selected, as it appears to be the case in relative terms for some Latin 
American countries, then the prospects of future migration increase the expected returns 
to skills in the source country, which leads at the end to higher incentives to acquire more 
education. Docquier et al [2008] claim that emigration may act as a substitute for 
education subsidies and may benefit source countries via the accumulation of human 
capital.  
The above arguments may miss many issues, though. To the extent that migrants take 
capital with them, the marginal product of labor may raise only slightly with emigration. 
Also, some migration comprises the most skilled and most educated workers, which may 
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lead to a “brain drain” with adverse economic consequences. Finally, we have the fact 
that migration can also have indirect effects on economic variables at the home country 
via the presence of remittances.   
 
3.4.3 Migration, Remittances and Secondary Effects on Labor Supply 
According to the neoclassical model of labor-leisure choice, remittances (as a source of 
non-labor income) may lift budget constraints, raise reservation wages, and, through an 
income effect, reduce the employment likelihood and hours worked by remittance-
receiving individuals. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006] start by identifying the 
different forms of endogeneity of remittances: (i) unobserved heterogeneity and omitted 
variable bias may exist if remittances are related to wealth which, in turn, may be 
correlated to the choice of work hours by the respondent, (ii) there is the potential of 
reverse causality as hours worked may influence emigrants’ decisions to send 
remittances. They then distinguish between the income effects that remittances may 
create on the receiving households and the disruptive effect of the migration of one 
household member, which may induce other family members to increase their supply of 
labor to compensate for lost household income and/or to defray household migration 
related expenditures.   
In their results for the Mexican case, the possible income effect appears to dominate in 
the case of women in rural areas, who seem to be using remittances to purchase time 
away from informal and nonpaid work. Among men, however, the latter income effect 
seems offset by a higher incidence of informal sector employment, possibly signaling the 
disruptive effect of household out-migration. 
Hanson [2005] had previously analyzed labor market participation in Mexico and finds 
that over the 1990s women (but not men) from high-migration states become less likely to 
work outside the home (relative to women from low-migration states). One aspect that 
has to be considered together with labor supply decisions is the possibility that migrants, 
and possibly relatives, engage in different economic activities such as self-employment. 
The movement into those activities may be the result of investments made into 
productive activities using previous remittances or the result of new skills and 
entrepreneurial abilities acquired by return migrants abroad.  One of the results of 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006] is that indeed remittance incomes appear to be 
associated with a reduced male labor supply in formal sector work and higher urban self-
employment. One line of potential research related to this literature is to address the 
implications of return migration on the domestic adoption of new skills and technologies. 
Also, equally important is the potential effect of remittances on the future ownership of 
new businesses.    
 
3.4.4 Return Migration, Remittances and Entrepreneurial Behavior 
There are several authors that view remittances as promoting dependency of recipient 
countries and  not contributing to the accumulation of productive capital (see, for 
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instance, Durand et al [1996] and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2005]). Contributing to 
this view is the observation that a substantial proportion of workers’ transfers are used to 
finance current consumption. This view has been corroborated by the studies pointing 
out that the receipt of remittances is sometimes associated with reductions in labor force 
participation of family members in the home country (Funkhauser[ 1995]).   
The central question is the extent to which remittances promote entrepreneurial activity 
and business investment by lifting financial and liquidity constraints. Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo [2006] examine the importance of remittances in promoting household business 
ownership. The existence of reverse causality from business ownership to remittance 
receipt at the household level motivates also to gauge the extent to which emigrants 
remit in response to the existence of investment opportunities and existing family 
business back home and/or to the possibility of a future bequest. They find, using data 
for the Dominican Republic, that remittances are attracted by the presence of investment 
opportunities back home, some of which may be reflected in the household ownership of 
a business. Yet, these monetary inflows do not seem to promote entrepreneurship 
activity despite their potentially important role as a source of capital for business 
investment. At the Macro level, the existence of a negative correlation between GDP 
growth and the level of remittances would indicate that remittances serve altruistic 
considerations and would not be intended to serve as a source of capital for economic 
development. This is the result obtained by Chami et al [2005] by employing aggregate 
cross-country data.  
Policy concerns should therefore aim at creating the incentives to allocate remittances to 
productive activities. The study of return migration and the occupational choice of those 
individuals are also crucial for understanding the paths leading to economic growth.   
As indicated earlier, the receipt of remittances, whatever the primary motive behind 
sending them, act by lessening the receivers’ production and investment constraints. This 
should strengthen investment and permit the accumulation of assets. However, this has 
not occurred in a significant manner in the specific case of Central America. In this case, 
the receivers of remittances mainly assign these resources to current expenditures 
(consumption), which is associated with the fact that most of those receiving remittances 
are persons with a low income level who use these funds to attend to their primary 
needs; it is also associated with the lack of investment opportunities. However, given the 
magnitudes that the flow of remittances have reached, one must not discard the 
importance of the part assigned to the generation of production activities, although 
potential exists for this portion to be greater.  
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Table I 
Central America: Remittances use 
 El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Nicaragua 
Current Expenditures 
(Consumption) 
83.9% 77.1% 68.1% 78.2% 
Investment in Business 4.2% 4.0% 10.2% 3.1% 
Saving 4.1% 3.8% 11.0% 2.8% 
Education 3.9% 10.0% 7.0% 12.7% 
Others 3.9% 5.1% 3.7% 3.2% 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from Pew Hispanic Center-MIF (2003) and Monge & Lizano 
(2006).  
 
Certainly, the investment decision is a function of the particular preferences of the 
families that receive the remittances income. Households have the freedom to spend that 
income in any way that is best for them. However, the percentage that is saved or 
invested depends not only on those personal preferences. It also depends on the business 
environment. So, areas where there are more investment opportunities and where the 
risks associated with investment is lower, we can expect that there will be higher fraction 
of income that will be invested. (Fajnzylber & Lopez [2006]).  
The factors that determine the business climate and the investment decision have been 
extensively studied. These factors are summarized at (CIPE [2004]).  There are also the 
factors that would allow the informal or "extralegal" sector to accumulate assets in a 
capitalization process through a movement from dead capital to live capital (De Soto 
[2003]). Both areas have received initial  attention for Central America (IDB [2005] and  
IDB [2007]). However, there isn’t an exhaustive work to examine if these factors are 
sufficient to make that remittances were used in greater proportion for productive 
investment.  
In general, the poor performance of the factors determining the attraction of FDI are 
those leading to the existence of few employment and production opportunities, and 
which lead to the decision to emigrate. These same factors, in turn, are those which limit 
the remittances productive potential. That is, the factors encouraging people to migrate 
also limit the productive potential of migrant remittances. It is unrealistic to expect 
migration to promote development in areas or countries where business climate 
conditions are so unfavorable. People migrate “because of the lack of meaningful 
development in the first place. In the absence of policies designed to channel migrants’ 
savings into productive investment, it is naive to expect migrants to behave very 
differently.” (Taylor [1999]). 
It is clear that remittances’ productive potential is associated with determinants of 
investment in general. However, given the intrinsic characteristic of the migration 
phenomenon and remittances, a set of specific factors exists that must be taken into 
account. These factors should in no way be taken as a substitute for those that influence 
the attraction of FDI and decisions to invest in general, but rather must be taken as 
additional factors associated with the specific case of remittances. Said factors are in 
general associated with a reduction in the cost of sending remittances, the push behind a 
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greater bankarization of remittances and measures to create a larger scale allowing for 
investment (Garcia [2009]).  
 
3.4.5 Migration, Remittances and Inequality in Source Countries 
Authors like Borjas claim that heterogeneity of skills and the consequent differences in 
inequality of income in source and receiving countries are key determinants of migration 
flows. But causality not only goes in one direction. Migration, and the subsequent 
process of remittances, is likely to re-shape income inequality in the source country. 
Some authors claim that, since remittances are aimed at alleviating poverty, income 
inequality will be lower. Acosta et al [2007], for instance, study the impact of remittances 
on poverty and inequality using cross-country data for Latin America. There are also 
studies for specific countries with similar findings. Adams [2003] finds that remittances 
reduce the severity of poverty in Guatemala; households in the bottom decile group 
receive between 50 and 60 % of their total income (expenditure) from remittances. 
The fact that remittances may contribute to reduce poverty does not necessarily imply an 
improvement in income inequality. According to Mckenzie and Rapoport [2007], 
international migration is costly and initially only the middle class of the wealth 
distribution may have both the means and incentives to migrate, which can increase 
inequality in the sending community. Considering the example of Latin American 
migration into the United States, different studies have found that migrants are relatively 
well-positioned in the skill distribution of the source country (Borjas[1987], 
Hanson[2005]). These circumstances imply that families with relative higher income 
(positioned in the middle of the income distribution) will send migrants abroad and will 
receive, as a consequence, the bulk of international remittances. A second mechanism of 
transmission discussed by authors such as Cox-Edwards and Ureta [2003] and Docquier 
et al [2008] is the effect of remittances on the levels of schooling of receiving households. 
If it is the case that those households, which have relatively higher income, manage to 
obtain higher rates of school retention, then the income prospects of these families will be 
higher into the future. This pattern would imply an increase in income inequality across 
time.  
This is, as a matter of fact, the result of some studies applied to Central America. Barham 
and Boucher [1998], for instance, construct no-migration counterfactuals to compare with 
the observed income distribution including remittances and they find that migration and 
remittances have increased inequality in Nicaragua. Gonzalez-Konig and Wodon [2005] 
show, using data for Honduras, that remittances are likely to be more inequality 
increasing in poorer as opposed to richer areas.  
Docquier and Rapoport [2003] get more in depth into the dynamic debate and show that 
whereas migration may generate higher income inequality, it may at the same time 
decrease wealth inequality. The short-run and long-run impacts of migration on income 
inequality may also be of opposite signs, suggesting that the dynamic relationship 
between migration and inequality may well be characterized by an inverse U-shaped 
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pattern. The existence of endogenous networks, however, may push towards a reduction 
in inequality. The formation of migration networks may lower the costs of moving 
abroad for future migrants in some communities, which can in turn lower inequality in a 
dynamic context. The overall impact of migration may be a reduction of inequality across 
communities with relatively high levels of past migration (which is in fact the conclusion 
reached by Mckenzie and Rapoport [2007]. 
One drawback of the current empirical literature is that it has failed to measure 
inequality in terms of lifetime income. Households with certain family structure may 
receive higher remittances, and as a consequence report a higher income, only because of 
life-cycle considerations. For instance, it may be the case that remittances increase 
temporarily income inequality. But if these resources will be used in the future to support 
the family members who moved abroad and now return, then ‘lifetime’ income of that 
household may not suffer any change. It is possible for a household to be a net receiver in 
one period and a net payer (to its migrant member) in another. Lifetime impact may 
differ from the annual impact. In fact, there is some evidence (see Deaton and Paxson 
[1994]) that income inequality within a cohort of individuals born in the same year 
increases as the cohort ages. Constructing therefore a counter-factual keeping in mind 
lifetime considerations may end up in a very different result (since families with 
migrants may be subject to very different shocks than families with no migrants). In 
another example, families that have migrants will surely face a completely different story 
into the future (perhaps they will invest more back in the home country and have higher 
earnings in the future), which will give us a greater impact on inequality and welfare.  
 
3.4.6 Old-age, return migration and fiscal sustainability 
One last implication of the migration process is the fiscal one. Return migration may 
seriously menace the fiscal balance of the home country if those migrants, who did not 
pay taxes nor contributed to any social security system, are entitled to claim social 
benefits, either in the form of pensions, access to health care services or any other form of 
welfare benefits such as poverty alleviation programs.  
The relation between migration and fiscal sustainability has been tackled in a number of 
studies, but basically from the perspective of the host (developed) country. Much less has 
been said about the long-run fiscal implications for source countries. One of the main 
lines of research into the future is to establish a bridge between the theories behind 
migrant behavior (which also determine return migration) and the impacts of migration 
on the sustainability of social expenditure in source countries. This proposed bridge 
demands the consideration of public policies and institutional arrangements, both in the 
source and receiving countries, as part of the determinants on the decision to migrate 
and, particularly, of the optimal length of stay and the possible decision to return home 
after some years spent abroad. Authors such as Dustmann [2001, 2003] have already 
proposed a framework for modeling migrants’ return decision and the optimal length of 
stay abroad. However, Dustmann starts from the assumption that the worker has already 
decided to migrate. The whole migration process must be modeled in a life-cycle context.   
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The direct effect can be visualized through the old-age support ratio as in equation (1): 
first, the emigration flow in the current period t reduces the existing workforce (it 
reduces the denominator); secondly, if a fraction, ‘α’ of emigration in period t-1 returns in 
period t, once workers are retired, the number of retirees increases (it increases the 
numerator). Migrants do not pay taxes but benefit first from education when young 
(before migrating) and then from possible old-age benefits when they retire and return 
home.  
Dependency Ratio t = 
tt
tt
MigrationWorkforce
MigrationElderly
−
+ −1.α                                              (1) 
Take the Mexican migration experience as example. About 400,000 Mexicans enter the US 
legally and illegally each year (Ross et al [2005]). Although some of these immigrants stay 
in the US, more than half return to Mexico after only a few years abroad (see Borjas and 
Bratsberg [1996]). As these ‘sojourners’ may spend more time working in the U.S., they 
may be unable to meet vesting requirements to qualify for a pension or health insurance 
in Mexico. If these return migrants do not either qualify for old-age benefits in U.S., they 
face the risk of poverty during retirement. Given the recent Mexican programs of poverty 
alleviation (the program ‘Seguro Popular’, for example),10 this scenario would imply a 
significant increase of public spending in order to offer a safety net to those workers. This 
adds to the adverse fiscal impact of an important aging process: while in 1995 only 4.2 % 
of the population was over 65 years of age, this proportion is expected to rise to 12 % by 
2030 (according to figures from the IMSS).  
Now, since migration reduces the home country labor force it is likely to increase the 
capital/labor ratio. Therefore, one should also consider the general equilibrium effects 
through possible decreases in interest rates and increases in wages. Lower interest rates 
would decrease the costs of servicing public debt whereas higher wages would increase 
tax revenues. The effect of migration on wages has been tackled mainly for host countries 
(the main approaches can be found in Card [1999, 2001] and Borjas [2003]). The study by 
Mishra (2007) is one notable example of the effect of emigration on wages in the source 
country (in this case, Mexico). Wage changes are not the only consequence of migration, 
though. As we have seen, remittances are another part of the picture. While worker 
remittances primarily benefit individual families (in fact, authors like Amuedo and Pozo 
[2005] report that a great part of the remittances are allocated to consumption), the 
priority we have discussed above is to encourage an increase in investments in the home 
country. Some authors have documented the potential of remittances for encouraging 
investments in small businesses and changes in the occupational activities of return 
migrants (see Ilahi [1999], Dustmann and Kirchkamp [2002], Woodruff and Zenteno 
[2007], Mesnard [2004]). The ideal scenario for high-migration countries like those in 
Central America would be to observe, in a dynamic framework, a higher capital 
accumulation in the long-run, which would translate into output growth and which, in 
                                                            
10 The programme Seguro Popular offers universal heath care in exchange of a small quota.   
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addition to the benefits already mentioned, would bring a greater margin to deal with 
dependency ratios and fiscal sustainability.11  
Even when many of the return migrants did qualify for US pension benefits, as it was 
discussed in the topic of portability of pensions, an extra problem may arise for the 
aggregate economy. The economic impact is closely related to the ‘centrality’ of output: 
people that when young migrate to the U.S. and return during retirement come and 
consume without producing. The consumption of these individuals will create an 
inflationary pressure in the absence of output growth. Migrants better positioned in the 
distribution of income could bid goods and services away from poorer domestic 
households, which would tend to reduce real consumption of other segments in the 
economy. Effects may be considerable for smaller Central American countries, where the 
non-tradable goods and services may become unaffordable for families with no access to 
remittances from abroad. This is a second-round force that may also affect dynamic 
income inequality.  
 
3.4.7 Remittances and the Economy at a Macro level.  
Whereas aggregate variables can help predicting the flows of migrants and their 
remitting behavior, remittances can also have, in the opposite direction of causality, 
subsequent effects on macroeconomic variables. The modeling of the Macro 
consequences is also relevant for the aforementioned exploration of the welfare benefits 
of remittances, especially while assessing different insurance and investment scenarios. 
This may be especially true if remittances constitute a significant source of foreign 
exchange as it occurs in many Central American economies.  
The more frequently studied  ‘Macro’ variable is national output (and economic growth). 
Rapoport and Docquier [2005] differentiate between short-run and long-run effects. 
Keynesian short-run approaches, assuming sticky prices, fixed exchange and interest 
rates, show that any shock on the demand side, such as the reception of international 
remittances, has a disproportionate effect on the national output and where the 
magnitude depends on parameters such as the marginal propensity to import and the 
propensity to consume remittances. The potential effect on GDP depends, therefore, on 
the assumptions made about the degree of capital mobility and the exchange-rate regime. 
In a pure flexible exchange-rate regime, the equilibrium level of GDP is fully determined 
on the money market and, hence, is unaffected by international remittances. A rise in the 
aggregate amount of remittances is fully compensated by a currency appreciation. In a 
pure fixed exchange-rate regime, on the other hand, the equilibrium of the balance of 
payments is obtained through variations in the money supply. It is only in this case that a 
rise in the aggregate amount of remittances may induce an increase of national income. 
Notice, however, that the final impact on national income may involve economic 
                                                            
11 By contrast, the general equilibrium effect of the reduced labour force due to emigration may 
have an opposite effect. Follow a mental exercise again: less labour implies a lower productivity of 
capital which consequently implies a fall in investment. Only in a second-round effect the price of 
capital would decrease and this would lead to a recover of investment.  
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paradoxes in high-migration economies.  Large positive transfers may deteriorate the 
terms of trade of the receiving country so much (a phenomenon commonly referred to as 
‘Dutch’ disease), that such economies may face what is called ‘impoverishing’ transfers: 
the decline in exports and national output that emerges from the terms-of-trade 
appreciation may dominate the direct positive effect on income. As we show in Figure 13, 
for instance, flows of remittances has become one of the main sources of currency for 
Central America, above the total value of goods exports and total External Aid. These 
resources improve the region’s current account balance and may indeed affect the terms-
of trade. An appreciation of the real exchange rate may increase the price of the exports 
of these countries and they will therefore lose competitiveness. The ultimate effect of this 
phenomenon would be a decrease in economic growth.12. 
Modern short-run macroeconomics, as pointed out by Rapoport and Docquier, are based 
more on a systematic exploration of the endogenous determination of wages and prices, 
a process in which expectations play a critical role. If expenditure shocks (e.g., induced 
by international remittances) are perfectly expected, the effect on the level of activity 
would then depend on the extent to which wages and prices are flexible. If prices are 
fully flexible, there should be no short-run effect on output (in such a setting, only 
unexpected shocks may generate departures from the natural output level). If prices or 
wages adjustments are sluggish, however, temporary real effects could be obtained. The 
main effects of remittances, however, may be channeled across time. To the extent that 
remittances, as it has been documented in Micro studies using survey data, affect labor 
supply decisions at home as well as the levels of investments in new businesses and 
accumulation of capital, then they may also have dynamic implications on the long-run 
steady-state of the domestic economy. A higher accumulation of capital may be obtained 
by designing the right incentives regarding the use of international remittances. Financial 
development and access to insurance and pensions funds may be the key factors to shape 
those incentives and the allocation of resources into productive activities. In short, 
remittances have indeed been found to be an important vehicle against poverty in many 
countries. But they also have the potential to contribute to economic development by 
providing savings for capital accumulation in the country of origin.  
4. Lines of Research 
 
Based on our above review of the economic literature on the determinants and effects of 
international migration, we can identify some research areas that can be exploited in the 
region. In the rest of this section we enumerate those areas as ‘research topics’ and offer a 
brief description of the identification of the problem, its relevance and the possible ways 
of assessing the question. Each of these topics may contain, moreover, a list of academic 
questions or hypotheses that should be tested empirically. The statistical conclusions on 
                                                            
12 Remittances may also affect domestic equilibrium, understood as a situation where capital and 
labor are efficiently used, namely through sectoral reallocation. RER will change in response to 
higher demand in the non-tradable sector as the traditional Balassa-Samuelson effect.    
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those hypotheses should allow us to address the viability of some specific policy 
measures. Depending on the type of question, the respective analysis could demand the 
use of two types of data: (i) data on migrants’ individual characteristics collected via 
surveys in the receiving country or; (ii) data on migrants’ individual characteristics, and 
perhaps data on the family of those migrants that remains back in the home country, by 
applying surveys in the countries of origin.    
Research Topic No. 1: Welfare policy and impact on migration variables and return 
migration.  
Access to welfare benefits and protection schemes, both in the receiving and the home 
countries, may be at the core of the decision to migrate, the duration of stay abroad, and 
the amount of remittances. One interesting empirical research agenda in order to gain a 
gauge of the importance of institutions and social policy on return migration, 
savings/remittances and the optimal duration stay in the U.S. is to assess the impact of 
the 1996 Welfare Reform Act via a before-after approach. One possibility for counting 
with a control group is to follow Borjas [2002] identification strategy and compare 
specific States, those whose immigrants were not significantly affected by such reforms 
given these States’ replacement of federal programs, against the rest of the country. Since 
the source of variation in this type of analysis is based on regional differences, data from 
the host country, the U.S. in this case, is needed.  The Current Population Survey may be 
useful for this purpose, especially to explore variables such as levels of savings and 
remittances. For this, and the rest of the research topics, it is also crucial to count with 
longitudinal survey data on individual migration experiences from the perspective of the 
home country. Surveys like Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and the Latin American 
Migration Project (LAMP), although not precisely panel surveys, offer some retrospective 
information about the Head of the household on variables like access to social security 
benefits, unemployment benefits, food stamps, etcetera, and also allow us to distinguish 
the State where the migrant lived and its legal status.          
Another database that can be useful for identifying immigrants’ participation in welfare 
programs is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This database 
contains panel waves that contain data for about 70 cash and in-kind income sources, 
including transfers from the federal government like social security. It also contains 
private transfers. The sample is representative at the national level and contains 
information on the national origin of individuals, allowing us to identify those of 
Hispanic origin.  
An additional line of research related to return migration is the exploration of the 
consequences of the 2003 Social Security Protection Act, which prohibits the eligibility to 
any pension or social benefit of individuals that worked illegally. The variables of 
interest include the duration of stay abroad (and whether the reform encourages return 
migration or not), the patterns of savings and remittances. 
Research Topic No. 2: Savings and the viability of investment schemes for remittances 
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Two important concerns have been discussed independently in the migration literature: 
the lack of social protection of migrants and the tendency of migrants and families to 
spend remittances in consumption. Although they seem indeed completely separate 
phenomena they can be put together via a specific solution for both, which is the creation 
of a mechanism of saving for retirement whose objective is twofold: protecting 
individuals against future economic downturns and taking advantage of the large 
availability of remittance resources in order to encourage productive investments. One 
could thing of a scheme where remittances are allocated into ‘defined-contribution’ 
individual investment accounts, which are now widely-employed in many pension 
systems of Latin American countries.  
As we mentioned in Section 3.4.1, one potential contribution in this field, from the point 
of view of economic analysis, is to propose a concrete model showing that migrants can 
be significantly better off inverting into savings vehicles, such as pension funds, than 
under current informal family insurance schemes. One should also show that such funds 
are superior in terms of return to other types of investment such as those in real estate 
(which are highly-favored by migrants but may result in low value/return in the long 
run, especially after taking account of demographic dynamics). One first step is to show, 
from an accounting perspective, that the potential resources to be managed are big-
enough so that the proposal of pension funds is sustainable. From the viewpoint of the 
design of those schemes, the discussion of incentive instruments enters with no doubts 
within the sphere of economic analysis. Since these are ex-ante proposals we have little 
access to past experiences and data. The evaluation of those proposals must therefore be 
done employing theoretical structural models capable of giving us different scenarios of 
individual behavior. The assumptions made about the degree of altruism and the 
‘insurance’ motivations of workers to remit are key factors in the modeling of migrants’ 
reactions.13    
Therefore, part of the exercises to address the feasibility of such a proposal is to 
determine the motivations to remit. Two hypotheses have been tested in the literature 
using survey data in the home country: (i) altruism hypothesis (whether remittances are 
meant to help relatives at the home country) and (ii) the insurance/portfolio hypothesis 
(whether remitting workers act according to their own self-interest and invest their 
resources for future consumption). If the insurance/portfolio hypothesis prevails over 
the altruism hypothesis then the empirical exercises play in favor of schemes like the 
proposed individual accounts. These types of exercises can be performed using 
household survey data in home countries. 
An alternative way of accessing the protection role of remittances is to determine, as 
suggested above in the Research Topic No. 1, if migrants with access to social security 
remit less that those without access. Data from the CPS and the SIPP would allow us to 
have a descriptive analysis of the amount of remittances, and other savings in the U.S., 
                                                            
13 This research agenda would also be interrelated to the theme of return migration and migrants’ 
entitlements to social benefits in both the destination and the home country and the possible 
exportability of those entitlements. 
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for workers with and without social security. In order to determine causality, we could 
focus on regional differences after the policy shocks of 1996 and 2003.      
It is also important to have a gauge of the extent to which migrants accumulate savings 
other than remittances and to determine whether savings in the destination country serve 
for a different purpose than remittances. Even if the altruism hypothesis prevails for the 
case of international remittances, the development of efficient savings vehicles that invest 
resources safely in home countries may encourage individuals to re-allocate part of their 
‘host-country’ savings into such a scheme. One may thing of schemes like the 3x1 in 
Mexico, where the government contributes 2 pesos for each peso contributed by migrants 
into investment projects. We could take the Mexican experience and evaluate if such type 
of deal may bring any benefits for Central American countries. 
 A basic descriptive analysis in this area should include variables such as the access to 
financial markets (and bank accounts), the access to social security, the legal status of 
migrants and the correlation they have with the amount of remittances and the levels of 
‘host-country’ savings. These may seem like basic statistics but have been rarely touched 
using descriptive regression tools.  
Finally, in terms of policy measures the regulation of the financial infrastructure is 
extremely relevant for two reasons. First, there seem to be barriers to competition among 
money transfer agents and fees are, therefore, too high. According to a report by the 
Migration Policy Institute, a think-tank in Washington D.C., reducing remittance fees by 
five percentage points could increase annual remittance flows to developing countries by 
US$ 5 billion. The second reason for regulation derives from the possibility to establish 
the aforementioned investment schemes to take advantage of remittances. Some policy 
areas identified in order to take advantage of remittance flows for investment and 
savings, while ensuring an adequate level of protection and consumption possibilities for 
migrants, are: (i) improving competition among money transfer operators (MTOs) and 
reducing transaction costs through incentives for improved technology; (ii) financial 
access through microfinance institutions (MFIs) and credit unions as well as through 
banks should be encouraged, especially related to products directed towards remittance 
recipients; (iii) governments can also promote the investment of remittances in 
microenterprise or other ventures; (iv) designing products that offer health and 
education services by MFIs. Pension schemes may be designed in this fashion; (v) Central 
banks can also team with the private sector to offer financial literacy programs to 
remittance recipients.  
Research Topic No. 3: Return Migration, New Knowledge and Development 
The development impacts of migration in home countries are transmitted by two 
channels: (i) the flow of monetary transfers and; (ii) the flow of people, and the 
subsequent transmission of new knowledge and skills. Great part of the literature has 
focused on exploring monetary flows such as international remittances, and how they 
help alleviating poverty, relaxing credit constraints and encouraging new investments. 
Flows of labor per se have been less studied in the region. Return migration may impact 
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the home country economy by several fronts. We would expect, by the re-incorporation 
of these returning workers into the domestic economy, a direct impact on labor markets 
and business activities. Although returning workers might saturate some segments of the 
labor markets and, consequently, depress wages, our hypothesis here is that return 
migration may also generate benefits in terms of new knowledge and 
production/occupational skills acquired abroad. A greater entrepreneurial spirit may be 
part of these new skills and return migrants may also count with the cash to make it 
possible. 
Any database designed for addressing the above hypothesis should contain basic 
characteristics of return migrants: age, educational level, legal status, time spent abroad, 
and the levels of income and wealth of those migrants getting back home. Surveys such 
as the MMP and LAMP contain retrospective information on migration histories and the 
survey follows the family and extended family in the U.S. It also contains information on 
the current activities of those once migrants (i.e. once they have returned). This type of 
data should allow us, therefore, to estimate a model like the one found in Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp (2002), where migrants decide simultaneously about the optimal migration 
duration, and their after-return activities.  
Now, in order to isolate the causal effect of having migration experience on learning new 
skills and, consequently, on returning migrants expanding new business activities, it is 
important to determine whether migrants who invest after returning differ from other 
migrants, say, salaried return migrants in terms of having accumulated more savings, 
training or having stayed longer abroad. A key concern has to do with the causality of 
the relationship, this is, whether higher savings or training induce afterwards to the 
involvement in self-employment in own business or if individuals with a preference for 
self-employment, but credit-constrained, self-select for longer stays abroad to accumulate 
enough wealth and skills. Depending on which hypothesis is accurate, policy measures 
can be designed. If the second case prevails, for instance, then a policy in the home 
country for wider access to credit should encourage productive activities.  In contrast, if 
it is the case that individuals somehow ‘learn’ to be entrepreneurial after having 
accumulated money and skills abroad, such a policy may not be that effective. If the 
causality implies that higher savings (maybe in the form of remittances) lead to higher 
prospects of starting up new business, then a policy of financial instruments that 
encourage savings makes particularly sense. 
Our hypothesis above is that migrant workers acquire skills and new knowledge abroad 
and then translated those skills into entrepreneurial activities at home. An additional 
research question that can be address under this topic is the impact of migration on the 
incentives not of migrants but of the people in the home country to invest in education 
and the acquisition of new skills. The general question is whether migration increases or 
actually reduces the level of education at the home country. Some authors argue that if 
migration is initially positively-selected, as it appears to be the case in relative terms for 
some Latin American countries, then the prospects of future migration increase the 
expected returns to skills in the source country, which leads at the end to higher 
incentives to acquire more education. A specific policy concern is whether national 
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governments should encourage the flow of educated workers. Recent literature suggests 
that this sort of policy, instead of leading to a ‘brain drain’, would lead to a ‘brain gain’ 
via the transfer of technologies and the higher incentives for workers who stay at home 
to acquire more education.  
  
Research Topic No. 4: Liquidity constraints and migration  
In Research Topic No. 3 we argued that some workers may be willing to invest in 
business activities at home, but given that they face credit constraints, they migrate in 
order to accumulate wealth. Notice that we can observe other kind of constraints in the 
case of workers who wish to migrate but face liquidity problems to finance the moving 
costs. These constraints imply that some workers may be willing to invest in business 
activities at home but they are both credit-constrained and with no money to afford the 
trip abroad. These relationships generate a series of questions. The first policy inquiry is 
whether the receipt of public transfers, say in the form of anti-poverty programs using 
cash transfers, raise the likelihood of migrating by relaxing any liquidity constraints. 
Data from the evaluation of specific programs, such as PROGRESA in Mexico or Red de 
Proteccion Social in Nicaragua, to enumerate some, would allow us to perform quasi-
experimental exercises in order to study changes in migration and remittance patterns for 
both individuals affected and those not affected by the respective programs.  
If anti-poverty programs indeed happen to reduce liquidity constraints for potential 
migrants and increase the flows of workers abroad, the concern is that, if this is not 
accompanied by more remittances or new workers’ skills, then financing migration 
without the benefit of remittances may be very harmful for labor markets and public 
finances. The inquiry would be now the extent to which those migrants tend to return 
home and engage in new business activities. If they return with new skills and money to 
invest then anti-poverty programs make sense. In terms of policy there is a disjunctive 
between allocating more resources into conditional cash transfers programs or into 
credit-enhancing programs for specific projects, say micro-enterprises. One drawback of 
micro-financing is that it may benefit the better-off and marginalize the poor. 
A separate research area that is linked to many of the already discussed topics is the role 
of migration networks. Access to networks abroad can reduce moving costs (including 
transportation, housing and job-hunting). Networks allow, therefore, more workers to 
move abroad and acquire more skills. But they may also mean that people integrate more 
easily to the foreign country. A consequent reduction in return migration and in the 
linkages to the home country may imply a decline in the flow of both (i) resources (i.e. 
remittances) and (ii) knowledge and skills.  
From the point of the home country, migration networks can be measured by the history 
of migration of some communities. From the viewpoint of families, indicators like the 
receipt of remittances or the number of people of the extended family abroad may serve 
as a measure. To study the effects of these networks, and to study, in general, the 
movements in dynamic variables such as return migration, savings and the acquisition of 
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new skills, ideally implies the availability of longitudinal data. We already discussed that 
surveys like the MMP and the LAMP make do the job in some instances by containing 
retrospective history of some variables. But the greater challenge in the region in terms of 
data availability for analysis is the development of rich panel waves of data which are 
representative of the migrant population and follow the same individuals/households 
across time. There are some examples of longitudinal household surveys in the region: 
the Mexican Family Life Survey is a representative database that spans for a period of at 
least 10 years to better understand the social, economic, demographic and health 
transitions happening in Mexico and the dynamics of Mexicans who decide to migrate to 
the United States during the first decade of the 21st century. In Central American, 
Nicaragua is the only country whose national household survey (Encuesta Nacional de 
Hogares sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida) is designed as a panel of data. And it 
contains a rich module of migration and remittances. Similar efforts can be done for other 
Latin American countries. In the specific case of Central America, the module of 
migration must be developed such that we can follow workers throughout an ample 
period of time in which we can observe the time they emigrate and then return home (if 
it is the case they do), and their associated characteristics all the way long. Support in this 
area will yield benefits in terms of economic and policy analysis and would allow 
clarifying what the policy priorities are in the region.  
5. Conclusions 
 
Although the phenomenon of international migration has been around for a while, in the 
last decades there has been a world-wide resurgence of it, which is larger in scale, wider 
is scope and is frequently accompanied by large flows of monetary remittances. 
Particularly in Latin America, although considerable progress has been made in the past 
decades, the economics of migration still remains for a large part terra incognita. The 
scarcity of studies and data is particularly alarming for the Region, where emigration 
represents an important drain of the labor force and the remittances they send back home 
account for a striking percentage of national income (particularly in Central American 
Countries). The numbers are so high that this sole dual phenomenon is capable of 
dictating the functioning of their whole economies. A more systemic exploration of it is, 
therefore, needed.    
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